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The paper presents the results of the author’s research on the innovations in Bulgarian 
socialist economy between 1950 and 1986. The first three parts argue about the problem 
traditional historiography encounters when studying innovations under the socialist non-market 
economy because of the inherently theoretical load of the very concept of innovation. They apply 
Joseph Schumpeter approach to the innovation in non-market economy, developed further by 
Peter Murrell (Murrell 1990), and critically adapted by the author in the light of the achievements of 
French sociology of innovation (techno-economic networks approach of Michel Callon) and theory 
of ‘second networks’ of socialism, developed by Czech sociologist Ivo Mozni and Bulgarian 
sociologists A. Boundjulov, A.Raichev and D.Deyanov.1 The second part of the paper discusses 
the empirically observed patterns of innovation under the socialist economy and analyses the 
activities of one key figure of Bulgarian industrial development in the second half of XXth century – 
Prof. Ivan Popov (Chairman of the State Committee of Science and Technical Progress, Minister 
of Electronic Industry, Minister of Machine-Building Industry and member of Bulgarian Communist 
Party Politburo, founder of Bulgarian Scientific and Technical Intelligence Service). The analysis, 
which is based predominantly on oral interviews, memories, and archival sources, outlines a 
distinct type of ‘socialist entrepreneur’ defined by the specific resources he has mobilized to 
introduces the corresponding innovations, some in the scale of entire industrial branches. This 
provides a ground for further comparisons with other possible types of ‘socialist entrepreneurship’, 
so that we could be able to better understanding of the peculiarities of the socialist economic 
environment, including the ‘deficit’ of entrepreneurial motivation and the necessity of its ‘import’ 
from abroad (capitalist countries). The paper also enlightens some of the specific barriers to the 
introduction of original innovations under the socialism. 
 
                                                
* This paper was presented during the International Workshop Cooperation and Participation in 
Technoscience in socialist and postsocialist space (Graz, Austria, May 4-5, 2009). The workshop was 
organized by the Institute for Advanced Studies on Science, Technology and Society (IAS-STS) in Graz, the 
Interdepartmental Centre for Environmental Law Decisions and Corporate Ethical Certification of the 
University of Padua, the Research Network 1989, The Jacques Maritain Institute in Trieste. The workshop 
was supported by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research and AREA Science Park (Trieste). 
1 See also 
http://www.policy.hu/tchalakov/Tchalakov%20on%20Socialism%20as%20A%20Network%20Society.pdf . 
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There's a curious symmetry between the arguments propounded over the last 
century in advocacy of socialism and the present popular discussion of the reform 
of former centrally planned economies. In those old discussions, the vision of 
socialism was utopian, which was contrasted with the Dickensian realities of 
capitalism. Now, the disasters of central planning are contrasted with the benefits 
flowing from perfectly functioning markets. In the conventional wisdom of reform, 
the vision of markets is utopian and that of central planning concentrates on the 
awful reality. What is largely missing in the conventional wisdom is a satisfactory 
attempt to come to grips with the central question that should be answered in 
formulating reform plans: How does one explain the differences in performance of 
market-capitalist and centrally-planned economies?  
Peter Murrell, 1991  
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
During the decades after WW II the ‘indigenous’ way the innovations have been framed by 
the agents of socialist economies was the notion of technical progress. It reduces the role of 
entrepreneur and considers the technical changes as external to the economy proper, i.e. as 
‘exogenous factor’. The introduction of innovations was conceived as a rational process, subject of 
socialist planning. Interesting enough, up until late 1970s the notion of technical progress was 
dominant in the neoclassical economics too, where the innovations have been also treated as 
‘exogenous’ to the economic system.  
One could find striking similarities the way technical changes was considered both by 
neoclassical economics and socialist political economy, both sharing what so-called ‘diffusion 
model of innovation’ (Callon & Latour 1986) which assumes that technology possesses ‘internal’ 
properties and that there exists a ‘social’ resistance against diffusion of given technology or 
artefact, so that the clash between technology proper momentum of development and the 
resistance to it leads to a certain delay in this development. The above assumptions, Callon & 
Latour claim, define the content of the three main principles behind the idea of ‘technical progress’: 
1) its irreversibility; 2) the ‘sociological’ barriers it has to overcome, and 3) the time needed a new 
technology to be established.  
Lying behind these principles and ideas is the general ‘philosophical’ assumption about the 
asymmetry between past events, which could be always explained by their (in)efficiency, 
profitability and necessity and present situation, which is always enigmatic to certain extent. More 
than twenty years ago the new sociology of innovation emerged precisely by questioning this 
assumption, and by posing the questions: How to understand innovations in their ‘proper present’, 
before history has judged with its standard schemes of reasoning? How to analyse and trace 
technical objects before they became efficient, profitable and indispensable?  
I believe these questions are relevant also in studying innovations in former socialist 
economies – here too we need to leave our privileged position of observers, who already know the 
outcome, and to try to revive the ‘open end’ situations, in which the past actors have striven to 
achieve their goals and to realize their strategies - because the technologies always emerge as a 
possibility among many others, as matter of dispute. Their profitability, efficiency and necessity are 
consequences from their development, and not its causes. As number of studies have shown, it is 
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not possible to judge between several competitive projects, based on states of technology, type of 
economies and markets, or laws of physics – the states are changing, market are created, physics 
is constructed (or revolutionised). Hence in their emerging and polemic state technologies are 
‘under-defined’, vague and unclear. Following Callon and Latour we could say that at this phase 
the main difficulty stems from the fact that it is at this ‘under-defined’ stage when the most 
important decisions about the destiny of the technical artefact are to be taken – what to be 
researched and developed, what marketing strategy to be elaborated, etc. And this is precisely the 
environment the entrepreneurs are facing with, including the ‘socialist entrepreneurs’.  
 
 
2. Were the socialist entrepreneurs possible at all? Some theoretical clarifications  
This section provides theoretical arguments that validate the use of the concepts of 
‘entrepreneur’ and ‘entrepreneurship’ in describing the economic activities of (some) 
representatives of the economic nomenclature in the former socialist countries. These include 1) 
reconsideration of the classical ideas of Joseph Schumpeter about the development in non-market 
economies; 2) a new understanding of the complex structure of ruling communist elite, which 
substantially differs from Schumpeter’s simplistic notion of ‘communist leaders’ or later notions of 
‘communist nomenclature’; and 3) arguments from techno-economic networks (TEN) theory about 
the specificity of innovation process in late capitalism. The arguments, developed in this section 
serve as conceptual frame for better understanding the empirical evidences, presented in the last 
part and describing the activity of Prof. Ivan Popov, one remarkable figure in Bulgarian economy 
during the period of 1949 and 1974. The concluding section summarizes the findings and raises 
some questions for further research. 
In his seminal paper on Entrepreneurship and Management, Alberto Martinelli provides a 
compelling – if brief - historical outline of the concept, pointing the importance of the three 
‘classical’ interpretation of entrepreneurship in Karl Marx, Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter.2 
For the subsequent development in administrative economies of socialism, it is important to stress 
that Marx “does not distinguished between the owner of capital and entrepreneur, and does not 
offer much insight into the specific features and behaviour of entrepreneurs as collective actors” 
(Martinelli 1994: 477), considering them in a kind of ‘deduction’ as personification of the capital as 
self-increasing value. Although he provided vivid descriptions of the role of bourgeoisie in the 
earlier stages of capitalism, much of which could be considered as true entrepreneurial activity, the 
later was not considered as something distinct for the large theoretical scheme of capital 
accumulation and growth. His later analyses in Das Kapital of the  automatic machines and 
transition from manufacture to factory system of production does not leave much room for the 
entrepreneurs either, considering them as ‘managers’ or supervisors of production processes in 
opposition to the workers. One could argue that this specific interpretation of Marx laid the ground 
                                                
2 It is beyond the scope of this paper the early contributions in economic theory of Cantillon (1755) and Turgot 
(1776), who first related the entrepreneurship with the acceptance of the risk and uncertainty inherent to 
economic activity, or Jean Baptist Say (1803, 1828) and John Stuart Mill, who introduced the distinction 
between entrepreneurial function and supply of capital.  
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of a tradition, where under the notions of ‘socialization of production’, of the ‘alienation of labor’ 
and its reverse appropriation under communist society the specific entrepreneurial function was 
largely neglected. For many decades entrepreneurship as a concept will practically disappear form 
the textbooks of Marxists political economy. 
In his economic analysis Max Weber retained much of basic Marxist assumptions pointing, 
however, the cultural factors that distinguished capitalist entrepreneurs from their earlier 
predecessors, such as “…rational and systematic pursuit of economic gain, calculation based on 
economic criterion, the relation between trust and credit, and subordination of consumption to 
accumulation, etc” (Martinelli 1994: 487). In his famous analysis of Protestant ethics and other 
writings, he managed to provide much more concrete and detailed picture of the role of the 
individuals in shaping the behavior of capitalist class as whole and in the functioning and 
development of modern institutions of capitalism, which somehow prepared the room for the 
subsequent analyses.  
It was Joseph Schumpeter (1912), however, who decisively linked the entrepreneurs with 
innovation, defining them as risk-takers, relatively independent of inherited property and 
introducing new combination of the factors of production, thus breaking the static equilibrium of the 
circular flow of the economy.3 These ideas shed new light on the mechanism of economic 
development in the capitalist market economy, preparing the advent of  the economy of technical 
changes as autonomous economic discipline (see Rosenberg 1976, Nelson and Winter 1976, 
Dossi and Freeman 1988).  
In an earlier article I argued that the classical Schumpeter's theory of the role of 
entrepreneurial activity as the driving force of economic development in market economy, outlined 
in his The Theory of Economic Development (1934), contains major premises, notions and 
explanations that provide important keys to understanding development in non-market economies, 
more particularly the economies with centralized planning and state ownership of East European 
countries (Tchalakov 2003). The first argument to support this is the fact that Schumpeter explicitly 
compares market economy with private property with non-market economies without private 
property, and he voices in passing some ideas about the mechanism of economic development in 
what he calls "communist" economy. Secondly, the Schumpeter's theory is relevant to the study of 
rapid industrialization (in fact "industrial transition") in some of the former socialists countries like 
Bulgaria – since it is not a theory of equilibrium, but of development, and the "development", 
"progress", "leap", "catching up with", etc. were not only ideological slogans, but the core of the 
economic efforts of socialism. As Janosh Kornai points out in his Political Economy of 
Communism, what he calls ‘forceful growth’ is "the type of growth typical of the system", one of the 
fundamental features of classical socialist economy. (Kornai 1992: 193) 
                                                
3 Few years later Frank Knight (1921) added to the important distinction between risk and uncertainty in 
economy as tool to discriminate for the truly entrepreneurial behavior. Martinelli adds to this line of 
development the contributions of Israel Kirzner, made many decades later (1973), who defined the 
entrepreneurial competition as discovery process and stressed role of the alertness, creativity, and judgment 
as inherent features of entrepreneurship and economic action in general. (Martinelli 1994: 485-86) Yet we 
should focus on Schumpeter in an attempt to understand astonishing neglect of  entrepreneurship and related 
concepts in the accounts of socialist economies during the decades around WW II.  
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Put in brief, the main findings of Schumpeter’s The Theory of Economic Development 
bearing on the problem of economic development in market economies could be summarized in 
the following way: 
 
• The distinction between ‘circular flow’ and ‘development’ is fundamental for the capitalist 
economy. In the first the economic system function in a ‘static’ state, as a ‘routine’ 
following the beaten track of ‘past cycles’. The ‘development’ signifies a specific class of 
economic changes - the radical, abrupt changes in production. 
• The source of development is ‘functioning in a different way’, i.e. the introduction of 
innovations (new combinations). Because the new combinations are always more 
profitable, key aspect of ‘economic development’ is the competitive elimination of the old 
forms of production. This process of ‘creative destruction’ is fundamental trait of capitalism. 
• The introduction of innovations is impossible without the function of the entrepreneur. The 
only contribution of entrepreneurs is their ‘will and action’ in channelling the existing 
production resources along new tracks. But the entrepreneurs could not implement new 
combinations without resources, i.e. 
• Having no access to capital - already existing or created ad hoc, which explains 
• The essentially different role of credits when the economy functions in a regime of 
development. Creating ‘ex nihilo’ means of disbursement (through a plethora of credit 
tools) and thus ensuring credit to entrepreneurs, the banker seems to ‘suck value from the 
future’ into the present economic cycles, hence dynamiting them.  
 
Based on this orderly theoretical scheme Schumpeter4 considers the following specificities of 
the innovation processes in the non-market (communist) economy.  
1) The important difference concerns the entrepreneurial function. This specific combination 
of ‘will and action’ is a type of leadership and demands qualities possessed as rule by a limited 
circle of individuals. This leadership is needed not only to break the routine and tradition, but also 
to overcome the adverse reactions of the social environment in which the new combination is 
carried out: the resistance of endangered producers ousted from the market by the new 
combination, winning over consumers, finding allies, etc. Precisely because these are rare 
qualities providing the possibility for every potential entrepreneur to possess [though temporarily] 
the resources necessary for the implementation of new combinations, i.e. access to credit, was a 
key condition for economic development.   
                                                
4 The Krtzner’s notion of entrepreneur departs from the assumption that ‘normal’ state of an economy is not 
the equilibrium of ‘circular flow’, but just the opposite – a state of disequilibrium, since its functioning is far 
from prefect. So the specific function of the entrepreneur is the ‘discovery’ of his own and other economic 
agents mistakes and their correction, which optimises the economy and approaches it to equilibrium. 
Considered from the individual perspective the entrepreneur, however, there is little difference whether his 
efforts could be considered as ‘discovery’ or ‘creative destruction’ since in both cases he is running against 
the inherited routines (Kirzner 1997) 
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In the Theory of Economic Development Schumpeter quotes two cases of non-market 
economy: a) the isolated kingdom where all the means belong to the signor, b) the isolated 
communist society in which the central authority possesses all commodities and labor resources 
and determines all commodity values. What is common between the two cases is that some 
individuals enjoy absolute control over the means of production. They expect no production 
cooperation, nor do they provide possibilities for making profit to other economic agents. So the 
problem of access to resources necessary for carrying out the new combinations "... does not exist 
in a non-exchange economy even if new combinations are carried out in it; for the directing organ, 
for example a socialist economic ministry, is in a position to direct the productive resources of the 
society to new uses exactly as it can direct them to their previous employments". (Schumpeter 
1934: 68) Hence follows the assumption that ‘communist leaders’ or the ‘central organ’ can play 
the role of entrepreneurs directly, without using bankers as middlemen. In the case when the 
banking system is formally preserved, but is controlled by the leaders, the latter combine both 
functions: of entrepreneurs and of bankers.  
This leads, however, to the narrowing of the social basis of entrepreneurship. The direct and 
absolute control on behalf of the communist leaders over resources deprives the remaining 
economic agents of the possibility to carry out independent entrepreneurial activities. They are 
economically unable to become entrepreneurs. Having in mind that only limited circle of individual 
possess the qualities to became entrepreneurs, the narrowing of the social bases has major long-
term effects on the rates of innovations and hence on the rates of economic development in 
communist economy. 
2) The direct control by communist nomenclature over the necessary resources creates an 
essentially different situation as regards risks and the speed of introducing innovations. In market 
economy the entrepreneur must first persuade the banker, gain his confidence so as to get the 
necessary credit. The conjuncture of the credit market has a strong impact on the rates and scope 
of entrepreneurial activity. In non-market economy all this is non-existent. If he deems so, the 
leader may always withdraw the necessary resources, even risking holding back or worsening the 
living standards of the remaining social groups. 
3) Another important consequence is the disappearance of the phenomenon of ‘creative 
destruction’. In market economy with private property the profit reaches the entrepreneur only after 
it has made its way through competition - it is not only competitively distributed among bankers 
and owners of capital, but also its very existence stimulates the next waves of surrogate 
entrepreneurs who, attracted by the success and monopoly profit imitate the First Innovator, ‘steal’ 
a bigger or smaller portion of the profit until fully exhausting it (the new combination has ‘aged’). 
The communist leaders' direct control over resources in non-market economy does away with 
competition and economic agents related to it: bankers and other autonomous entrepreneurs.  
There are two consequences for development stemming from above. On the one hand the 
fusion of the functions of entrepreneur and banker abolishes barriers before the quick introduction 
of innovations. On the other hand, however, it also does away with pressure on sectors working 
under old combinations. Schumpeter maintains that in socialist economy new and old 
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combinations can exist in parallel and profit be distributed among them. The complete restructuring 
of the sector on the basis of the new, more effective combinations is a matter of authoritative, 
administrative decision, rather than a competitive pressure. 
Why these Schumpeter’s ideas about the entrepreneurial function of communist leaders (or 
‘nomenclature’ - as they became known in the former communist economies) found little influence 
in the subsequent economic analyses of these economies, up until 1990 they were first applied by 
Peter Murrell in 1990? In my view there are important reasons for that.  
On the one hand it was the development of managerial capitalism, i.e. the gradual 
establishment of monopolistic or oligopolistic markets in each industrial sector during the decades 
around WW I, where the large corporations played an increasingly important role, hence sharply 
reducing the role of individual entrepreneurial efforts. As Martinelli pointed out, during the interwar 
period authors like Rathenau (1918) described ‘organisierte Kapitalismis’ as based on 
depersonalisation of property and passing the same path the modern state did, while Berle and 
Means (1932) claimed that separation of ownership and control irreversible trend, with the rise of 
the modern corporation considered as ‘organised social group based on interdependence of 
different economic interests – owners, employees, consumers, and the controlling group 
(managers). (Martinelli 1994: 488). In 1970s A. Chandler described this process as the transition 
from family to managerial capitalism, resulting from technological innovations, larger markets, 
international competition, industrial concentration, vertical integration, etc., (Chandler 1977). The 
period was also marked with increasing involvement of governments in steering economic 
activities, after the new experience they obtained during the WW II (see Reich 1992).  
At first glance even in these economic conditions certain groups of "dependent employees", 
a term by which Schumpeter denotes technical directors, managers, board members in large 
companies and corporations, can still be regarded as entrepreneurs and can really fulfill 
entrepreneurial functions, receiving in return not profit, but a wage increase. He links this 
phenomenon, however, with the "disappearance of entrepreneurship" in late capitalism, with its 
bureaucratization, considering the separation of ownership and control as sign of crisis, preparing 
for advent of socialism:  
“With the fading of entrepreneurial function and weakening of bourgeois institutions 
such as private property and contract, the bourgeoisie declines too, the main reason being 
the progressive decay of entrepreneurial functions because of routinization of the 
innovations in large organisations, which render the entrepreneurial function superfluous… 
The true pacemakers of Socialism are not the intellectuals or agitators who preached it, 
but Vanderbilts, Carnegies and  the Rockefellers. (1942, p.134) 5 
                                                
5 See the interesting discussion at Langlois (1987) about whether one could really discern between ‘young’ 
and ‘old’ Schumpeter in his views about the role of entrepreneurial function in capitalist market economy and 
its disappearance with the increasing dominance of large corporation that transform innovations into routine 
activity of salaried employees, and which eventually leads to socialism. According to Langlois it seemed that 
Schumpeter nevertheless believed in the possibility of rational organization of the economy, to which 
socialization of property, centralization of control and mechanisms of planning appeard as main vehicle. He 
possible was not convinced in the Hayek’s arguments about the limits of centralization and indispensable role 
of the local knowledge in the economic process (Hayek 1945).  
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This was the context the socialism as economic system emerged after WW I. Coupled with 
the tradition of Marxist political economy it left no room for the entrepreneurship as a tool for 
understanding the processes in the emerging administrative economies. The post WW II 
dominance of corporate capitalism in USA and other Western countries strengthened the 
understanding of socialist economy in neoclassical term, the opposition between the two system 
gradually moving on political and ideological ground (with notable exception of Hayek and Austrian 
school):  
“From 1930s to the 1950s, distinguished scientists with Marxist sympathies – like 
Bernal, Blackett and Joliot Curie – argued persuasively that public ownership and central 
planning were better able than the capitalist system to mobilize S&T for economic and 
social progress. The argument was considered more widely in the early 1960s in the light 
of the Soviet lead in manned space flight and in rates of economic growth… Indeed, one 
former economic advisor to President Eisenhower wrote the book entitled The Price of 
Freedom, in which he argued that the pluralism of the capitalist system could not hope to 
compete with the centrally planned system in mobilizing resources for investment, 
education and ambitious technical advance.” (Pavitt 1995: 44) 
The result was the gradual ‘disappearance’ of the entrepreneur in economic theory. Barreto 
pointed out that “…with the advent of the modern theory of the firm, the economics lost track of the 
entrepreneur, [because] the framework assumptions – especially those of perfect rationality, does 
not allow for a consistent implementation of the entrepreneurial behaviour - role of the 
entrepreneur reduced to a ‘static, passive and therefore redundant economic agent within a self-
running firm.” (Barreto 1989:84)  In the decades that followed, the ‘heroic’ entrepreneur appeared 
in the mainstream neoclassical economics in the paradoxical from of a sign of underdevelopment 
and/or distortion of the markets. As Martinelli put it, the dominant development economists at the 
time  
“…shared the idea that pure entrepreneurial profit would be the smoothly 
corresponding reward that market conditions require and makes possible. This approach 
assumes that factors of production are relatively mobile; that producers, consumers, and 
resource owners have knowledge of all the opportunities open to them; that risk and 
uncertainty are minimal; and that the influence of social institutions is neutral. The policy 
implications of this approach for development strategy are: let the market work, remove 
the barriers of traditional society, and entrepreneurs will appear from everywhere. When 
the above assumptions are relaxed and market segmentation, ignorance, impeded factor 
mobility, and pervasive administrative controls appear, the ‘extraordinary’ role of the 
entrepreneur becomes apparent, as does the need to analyze more carefully the factors 
that can favour his formation.” (Martinelli 1994:485) 
From here stems the caricature accounts of the ‘inherent’ deficiencies of the administrative 
economy, similar to those I found in Amann and Cooper (1982) book on Industrial Innovation in 
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Soviet Union (see also Berliner 1988; Kornai 1992). Talking about the ‘rift between science and 
production’, they wrote: 
“… This fundamental problem of harmonisation is evidently and exceedingly 
troublesome one in all societies. In Western countries it is ameliorated to some extent by 
the fusion of science and production within large industrial firms; many of the problems still 
exist but the close proximity of the two sides induces some modification of behaviour… In 
the Soviet context neither the structure of incentives, nor the organisational framework 
encourages harmonisation of scientific and industrial objectives. Soviet industrial 
enterprises tend to play only a minor role in research and development... [and] by far the 
largest proportion of industrial R&D is carried out by specialist institutes which are 
separate in both an organisational and geographical respect from industrial enterprises… 
What this can mean in practical terms is exemplified vividly by eh case of the AKESR 
range of industrial control instruments. The initial research was done in Moskow; the 
experimental plant was set up in Smolensk, 380 km to the West; preparation for 
production began near Kazan, 1200 km from Smolensk and the final manufactural plant 
was located in the Wstern Ukraine, 2200 km from Kazan… It is an arrangement which flies 
in the face of a deeper sociological reality and permits the bifurcation of science and 
industry, inherent to all countries, to develop unchecked. The consequences of this rift are 
a major theme in Soviet writings about industrial innovation” (p.15).  
 
Reading such texts the reader remain with tedious impression that they completely missed 
their target, finding only relative differences between administrative and (corporate) market 
economy, and referring to the mysterious instances such as ‘deeper sociological reality’.6 Having 
fallen in similar situation, in his study of Eastern European foreign trade Peter Murrell articulated 
the problem in a following way: “…By applying neoclassical theory in an empirical framework, I 
sought to discover the characteristic features of socialist economic behavior, but as the analysis 
proceeded, it became clear that marked differences between the two types of economic systems 
were not a significant element of the results derived from the traditional economic models” (Mirrell 
1990: 3-4).  And in search for solution he “sought refuge on a Schumpeterian theory of economic 
behavior”.  
 
 
3. Schumpeter revisited: the unexpected problems the socialist entrepreneurs had to 
cope with 
 
Empirical studies of the real functioning of communist economies during the decades 
between 1917 and 1989 have confirmed most of the Schumpeter’s ideas, adding some new 
                                                
6 The superficiality of the reference to ‘geographical disparity’ became evident if we compare the AKESR 
example with the scope of activities of Elon Musk, one of the most successful US space entrepreneurs, 
whose design and manufacturing unit is in California, testing facilities in Texas, while launch pads are in 
Florida and Marshall Islands.   
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factors missing in the original model, such as militarization of the economy, specific patterns of 
foreign trade, economic functions of the secret intelligence services etc., (see Hanson and Pavitt 
1987, Murrell 1990, Kornai 1992, Revol 1994, Tchalakov 2003). Yet there are other aspects of 
these economies, which Schumpeter model simply fail to take into account, but which are of 
crucial importance to their understanding.   
The first aspect is related with Schumpeter’s perception of "communist leaders" as 
homogeneous group. The nomenclature, however, is split in different camps not only vertically, but 
also horizontally. The division lines and functions of the different groups vary during the different 
stages of evolution of socialism. Hence the entrepreneurial behaviour of the leaders varies - the 
internal straggle and constellation of forces between different camps of the communist 
nomenclature strongly influence the speed and direction of economic development. The recent 
ideas, developed in the framework of so-called ‘historical sociology of socialism’ provide a clue for 
understanding the real dynamics of innovation process in socialist economies7, discovering the 
pendulum-like movement from total dominance of administrative coordination (i.e. taking off the 
power of mediators - commodities, money) to the rise of 'second networks' (i.e. weakening the 
power of hierarchies and restoring the power of goods and money) and back.  
The second aspect is that Schumpeter takes for granted the source of innovation (invention, 
discovery). He notes that "... it is no part of entrepreneurial function to 'find' or to 'create' new 
possibilities. They are always present, abundantly accumulated by all sorts of people. Often they 
are also generally known and being discussed by scientific or literary writers. In other cases, there 
is nothing to discover them, because they are quite obvious." (Schumpeter 1936: 87). This 
assumption ignores major aspects of the relation between the process of discovery and innovation. 
Recent studies in the fields of the economy of technical changes and science & technology studies 
(STS) have revealed close interdependence between public investment in science and education 
and the heavy ‘infrastructure work’ that mediate appropriation of relevant discoveries in the 
economy. The socio-technical networks approach and especially its notion of 'emerging' and 
'stabilized' configuration might be a crucial for understanding the intimated interrelations between 
former socialist economies and capitalist economies. (Callon 1992, 1996, see also Tchalakov 
2001, 2006) 
My hypothesis is that critical analysis of three theoretical frameworks - Schumpeter ideas, 
techno-economic networks approach and historical sociology of socialism - make possible the 
outline of the specific innovation regime in socialist economies as dynamic interplay between: a) 
the process of expansion of world-wide socio-technical networks of industrial production, which 
made former socialist economies compatible in principle with capitalist ones; and b) indigenous 
mechanism of struggles and negotiations between different wings of the communist nomenclature, 
hidden behind the all-encompassing administrative coordination (hierarchies). This interplay 
possesses its internal dynamics, which at the 'surface' of socialist economic development appears 
                                                
7 See for example Mozni 1998, or the papers of D. Deyanov,  A. Bundjulov  and I. Tchalakov in Sociological 
Problems, Special Issue 2006 
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as changes in the capacity of socialist economy to introduce indigenous technological innovations 
and to absorb those made elsewhere.  
 
 
3.1. The tensions between political and economic nomenclatures as 
indigenous phenomenon of socialist economy 
 
To begin with Janos Kornai observation, that in the first decades of their existence, all 
countries with an administrative socialist economy at lower stage of their development as 
compared to the advanced socialist states, reported remarkable growth and investment rates. For 
example in the 1960s Bulgaria became one of the most rapidly developing countries, and most of 
the socialist countries were among the world’s 20 front-rankers. (Kornai 1996, p.166) However, in 
the beginning of the 1970s, the rates started going down and a decade later, they went below 
zero. How one could accounts for such a dynamics?  
Although the entire development of socialism was marked by the internal differences 
between the various segments of the communist nomenclature, the struggle between two main 
wings of communist nomenclature – “political” and “economic” ones, was especially important.8 
The political nomenclature comprised the members of organizational and ideological departments 
of communist party together with secret police as their ‘right hand’ (including those monitoring 
foreign trade with the West). It possessed the main asset (or ‘capital’) for steering every field of 
society – control over the ‘cadres’, the appointment and promotion of relevant people on key 
positions. With the reforms that have been gradually introduced in Bulgaria since late 1960 (with 
temporary hold after 1968) the dominant positions of political nomenclature have been challenged 
by the increasing power of economic nomenclature, i.e. the ‘cadres’ managing the economy -from 
the lowest position of directors of the enterprises, through the managers of the large vertically 
integrated state ‘combines’, to the heads of economic ministries and their officers. The later has 
developed its own sense of unity, its own ‘industrial ethos’ and managed to establish itself as a 
group opposed to the political nomenclature. From this point of view the history of the higher 
echelon of Bulgarian Communist Party was marked by several big clashes between these two 
wings, each time the political nomenclature taking over the economic one. This happened first at 
the end of 1960s with the dismantling of legendary economic cartel “Bulgarian Sea Fleet” (former 
TEXIM), when the founder and chief manager of the cartel Georgy Naydenov was prosecuted and 
put in jail under false accusations. The same happened in early 1975, when Prof. Ivan Popov – the 
man who initiated the successful development of electronic industry and later became deputy 
Prime Minister and member of Politburo – was dismissed from all his positions and send 
ambassador to Switzerland. Their high recognition in Bulgarian society, especially among 
                                                
8 More on internal tensions of communist nomenclature see in: Boundjulov, A. 2003. ‘What Emerges in the 
Place Of? Artificial Joints and Networks Under Socialism’. In: Historical sociology of socialism: special issue, 
Sоciological Problems 1/2 (in Bulgarian). 
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industrial managers, threatened the power of party’s organizational and ideological departments, 
including top leadership of the country. 
If we should stick to the Schumpeter’s initial model, the separate party (organizational and 
ideological) units of the nomenclature are absolutely unnecessary for economic development. The 
economic nomenclature could structure and reproduce itself quite independently. Meanwhile it can 
recruit people from the enterprises and universities and promotes in the hierarchy the party 
members who are successful in the introduction of innovations and the development of the 
economy. Unexpectedly, it turns out that the economic nomenclature - just like the entrepreneurs 
in the capitalist economy, faces again certain limitations of its activity. However, the restrictions 
now are imposed not by bankers and competitors, but by party (organizational and ideological) 
nomenclature.  
Presumably, during the first stage of accelerated development, this constellation had been 
advantageous for both sides. The economic apparatus needed an organizational and ideological 
apparatus to secure resources for the infrastructure and launch innovations in entire branches 
(what Stalin did in his time), something the economy itself failed to do – “temporary” 
overexploitation of the peasants, large-scale literacy campaign, creating ample opportunities for 
secondary and higher education, development of research and information (libraries) 
infrastructure, scientific and technological intelligence work, mobilization to observe the labor 
discipline, etc. With the advance of industrialization, however, the situation changed. The 
administrative system based on “Plan”, socialist “moral sense”, and on overt or hidden “Terror” 
started to slip.  
However, it is not possible to identify the cause of these processes staying in Schumpeter’s 
model only. We have to clarify the nature of planning in the late capitalist economy and henceforth, 
in the socialist economy, as outlined by the theory of the techno-economic networks (TEN).  
 
 
3.2. The socialist planning reconsidered. From emerging to stabilized techno-
economic networks. 
 
When analyzing the entrepreneurs, Schumpeter considered the keys for economic 
development in introduction of innovations as new form of economic behaviour, different from the 
inherited ones. However, already the second industrial revolution in the end of 19th century showed 
that the new combinations were impossible without the large-scale development of fundamental 
and applied research. This process unfolded after World War I and more so after World War II 
when new industrial branches emerged on the basis of the latest scientific and technological 
achievements.  
We cannot possibly analyze the entrepreneur's activity and the introduction of innovations 
after the Second World War if we don’t examine the relation between the production of new 
scientific and technological knowledge and its integration into the economy – simply because most 
entrepreneurs are already holders of scientific degrees or have a long length of service in 
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universities, research institutes and industrial laboratories. The administrative economies in 
Eastern Europe appeared at about that time. It is not accidental that the “economic application of 
the latest achievements of science and technological progress” became their major ideological 
slogan and an immediate practical task.9 
Promoting the notion of techno-economic network (TEN), Michel Callon notes:  
“…Today economic organisation as a way of coordinating different mutually 
supplementing activities has spread beyond the industrial sphere and the lonely world of 
the enterprise. Public or semi-public research centres, technical centres, research and 
engineering offices, etc. are increasingly becoming full-fledged economic actors, like the 
public political authorities themselves…The entire society and its economy resemble a 
strange socio-technical complex in which human and non-human actors continuously 
interact” (Callon 1992, p. 54)  
This notion reflects the structure of the market economy in the developed Western countries 
by the end of the last century. The mechanisms of “translation” between technological solutions 
and the logic of the market, advanced by the theory of the techno-economic networks, are based 
on the new understanding of the nature of scientific and technological knowledge as a unity of 
three interrelated elements: 1) codified knowledge (objectified in scientific texts, formulas and 
diagrams); 2) technical artifacts (scientific equipment) to corroborate this knowledge; 3) specific 
skills embodied in scientists and engineers as their ability to use scientific texts, operate the 
scientific equipment and interpret and compare data and texts.  
The development of sciences and technologies implies the establishment and maintenance 
of a network of local research centers (laboratories) and channels along which the above elements 
circulate as a special kind of mediators (scientific texts, artifacts and accomplished scholars and 
engineers). It is a dynamic process of local reconfiguration of the experience when new ways of 
handling the natural and other agents are devised in the laboratories. After that, the agents 
circulate as mediators along the junctions of the networks where they are “put to the test”. Only 
then are they endorsed and integrated into the scientific and/or industrial practice.  
The studies have shown that this process is extremely expensive and involves a constant 
high level of investments. The traditional idea of scientific and basic technological knowledge as 
universally accessible “public good” is thereby changed. It is only because of the local level of 
investments, that this knowledge can become public good. (Callon 1994) You can benefit from the 
announcement of a new scientific discovery or a new patent only if you have been prudent enough 
to invest in relevant workforce and equipment in good time. The development of science and 
technologies resembles an oligopolistic market where admission is limited – only the “club” people 
who maintain a high level of investments in (techno) science and the related high-tech industries 
can “appropriate” the results of research.  
                                                
9 Although having access to the evidences on major efforts of socialist countries in the field of science and 
technology, Kornai stays away of  Schumpeter’s line of reasoning maybe because he  too considers 
technologies and science as an “exogenous factor” of the economic dynamics. 
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In an earlier text (Tchalakov 2002: 51), we highlighted some specific features of the socialist 
economy, which impede the application of the TEN approach. The major difficulty stems from the 
popular belief that this economy is “administrative” and “hierarchically structured” and that the 
immediate economic agents have practically no autonomy. In the light of the latest findings of 
historical sociology of socialism, the situation becomes more tangible. We possess now 
conceptual tools to go beyond the apparent dominance of communist elite in the system of 
administrative coordination, to describe the presumptive real actors of socialist economy and “give 
them the floor”.  
The analysis of Bulgaria’s socialist economy evidences that until the early 1970s the key 
problem had been the copying and diffusion of innovations that already had come out successful in 
the developed (Western) countries, rather than the development of original scientific and 
technological products and their application. Successful innovations had been also the transfer of 
whole industrial branches such as machine-building, chemical industry, electronics and so on. 
There had been no attempts to develop independently and introduce original innovations, 
especially in the military sphere.  
If translated into the TEN language, Kornai’s conclusion that “technological progress in the 
classical socialist economy entails only the copying of innovations in the advanced capitalist states 
(Kornai 1996, p. 278) would mean the necessity of creating conditions for the simultaneous 
“transfer” of the three components of science and technologies – codified knowledge, embodied 
skills and the relevant artifacts. In turn, this implies the integration of these countries’ economies 
into the global techno-economic network established in the most advanced capitalist economies 
and to transport the “local reconfigurations of experience”. 
Probably the most significant contribution of the TEN approach in perceiving the dynamics of 
the socialist economy relates to the notion of “state of the techno-economic network”. (Callon 
1996) Two such states are distinguished: 1) emergent networks (emergent configurations) and 2) 
consolidated networks (consolidated configurations). The difference between them is that contrary 
to the economic common sense, knowledge and skills in the newly emergent networks are rivalry 
and appropriable whereas in the established networks they are a common public good of 
universally acknowledged utility.  
According to this distinction, in the emergent networks the codified statements (publicized 
discoveries or patented engineering projects), which are fresh from the laboratory or the research 
center, prove extremely contestable just like any other commodity. They are not simply statements 
but a set of “statements+instruments+embodied skills”. Initially this package exists in only one 
specimen and the first repetition prompt the replications of the other elements of the package – 
delivering a scientific report, diagram, etc.; securing the necessary equipment; training 
researchers, engineers and technicians. The “copying” of the instruments is not an easy job. It 
involves long and complicated operations such as calibration, production of the necessary 
materials and substances, huge standardization work. All this is carried out through 
transformations and adaptations. It requires costly investments and considerable infrastructure 
(assembly lines, theories, scientific and engineering societies, etc.): “…the notion of information is 
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preposterous unless hidden infrastructure works are underway and investments are available for 
that purpose”. (Callon 1996, pp.49-50) As this process gets along, the mutual interests become 
stable and the networks intersecting them spread out and solidify so that the statements to 
become non-rival and non-appropriable. Scientific and technological knowledge turns into 
information.  
The stabilized networks reveal thus quite a different world: 
“There are many places where one and the same instruments and embodied skills 
are available and open to mobilization. They help communicate meaning and utility to the 
statements that circulate inside the network. With such a configuration the scientific 
statements are indeed non-rival and impossible to appropriate. This is called universalism 
inside the network”. (Callon 1996, p.50)  
In this structured and stabilized world, the programs can be defined in advance because the 
states of the possible worlds are likewise easy to identify. The possibility “to formulate implicit 
expectations” is a fundamental property of the stabilized networks: 
 “…The programs of the different economic actors (corporations, governments, etc.) 
precede action and set its size and shape. To some extent, they are mutually replaceable 
because the actors know each other’s objectives and mobilize similar competences. Every 
program engages a certain amount of resources and can establish a relation between 
them and the expected objectives. The expectations are rational: the actors possess 
identical capabilities and, therefore, their estimates of the consequences of the action, 
program, etc., are similar. As a result, the behavior of the competitors becomes 
predictable." (Callon 1996, p. 51) 
I think we are familiar with this world – the objectives and priorities are clear-cut and definite, 
the necessary resources can be estimated and programmed. But why ‘programs’ - we can safely 
call them “plans”: annual plans, five-year plans, etc! The plans can be reduced to tasks and behind 
each task there is an actor with his rights and responsibilities: “Communism is Soviet power plus 
electrification of the whole country!” The GOELRO plan… What followed was a boom of industries: 
machine building, chemical engineering, electronic engineering, and biological sciences. Simply a 
techno-economic network or a series of reconfigured networks. However, these networks were 
already well known, had been “approved” and stabilized in some other places! It remained only to 
spread and extend them.  
 
 
3.3. The original dynamics of the innovation process under the socialist 
economy: the case of Bulgaria. 
 
To sum it up: when a socialist country is building its industry, it is actually in a situation that 
can be defined neither as an emergent nor as a stabilized network. On the one hand, its industry is 
not yet part of a “long and stabilized network” where the actors have similar competences and 
embodied skills, similar production equipment and experimental facilities, and stable channels for 
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the circulation of the scientific texts (“information”). Here the information, skills and artifacts are 
unequal and asymmetric. They are yet to be established. On the other hand, however, the process 
of their establishment differs significantly from the emergent networks described by Callon 
because we don’t have the unique and newly emerged sets of “statements+artifacts+embodied 
skills”, but rather the sets which are already known. 
 At first glance, the aim is the same – in the industrializing socialist society like in the newly 
emergent networks in developed capitalist countries the three elements must be “transported” 
together. However, along with this, the socialist ‘entrepreneurs’ were saved from the risk of not 
knowing exactly what should be transported, what behavior “leads to identifiable results" and so 
on. The communist leaders have learnt about the necessary statements, artifacts and embodied 
skills much in advance - because they have been identified and spread throughout developed 
capitalist countries.  
It is precisely at this stage, in the conditions of “clearly defined goals” and “predictability of 
resources” that the advantages of administrative coordination over the market in terms of 
mobilization and control of the resources, are manifested. It is the time when the removal of the 
inherently capitalist barriers to entrepreneurial activity produce “positive effects” – the communist 
elite obtains complete and direct (without the mediation of bankers) control over the resources and 
receives the entire entrepreneurial profit. The elite enjoys freedom of action, which is not possible 
to have in the capitalist economy: the adversaries of the system and hence competitors are 
ruthlessly crushed; because of the communist propaganda, most of the working people are 
“disciplined and ready to make sacrifice” in the name of the “bright future”. Most importantly, it is 
generally clear what should be done, i.e. it is possible to plan! 
It might be that the socialist project had been possible precisely because of the specific 
situation in the countries peripheral to capitalism. The catchphrase “Soviet power plus 
electrification!” fully communicates the essence of this project. In the course of thirty years (1874 – 
1904) a galaxy of inventors and industrialists made numerous experiments (Edison, 
Westinghouse, Nickolas Tesla, Siemens, etc.) and huge resources were spent until electrification 
stabilized in a form which has remained unchanged ever since: alternating and not direct current; 
power generation at the raw-material sources and large distance electricity transfer along high 
voltage transmission lines; consumption in the daytime (through a.c. electric engines) to make up 
for the evening loading (for lighting, etc.). It was not until after thirty years of experimenting, 
described by Thomas Hughes in Networks of Power, that someone like Lenin could come onstage 
and pronounce the famous winged phrase encouraging millions of people to perceive the rightness 
of the course and follow him.  
During its first stages, the administrative economy is a privileged world where you can be the 
“pioneer entrepreneur” and will be protected from the mistakes of those who have built the network 
somewhere else. This is the basis on which the socialist Plan becomes applicable. However, it is 
not a “self-conscious subject” (revolutionary vanguard), which stands behind it but a special 
configuration of stabilized socio-technological networks of developed capitalism. It is this 
configuration that makes the revolutionary vanguard possible.  
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It is already clear that what Kornai used to call “copying” of Western technologies screens a 
much deeper and larger process of reconfiguration of the inherited techno-economic network in the 
socialist economies. A country like Bulgaria could not profit by scientific and technological learning 
unless it had invested previously in its own science and technologies and had built its own industry 
to “appropriate” the relevant scientific and technological knowledge. It did not become “public 
good” and remained the possession of an oligopoly of several developed industrial states for a 
long time. This process lasted for almost two decades (from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s) and 
it was not until scientific, technological and production infrastructure was built in a wide range of 
branches that the scientific and engineering information became a resource to be mobilized.  
Now we are able to outline behind the pendulum-like dynamics advanced by historical 
sociology of socialism yet another, linear dynamics of socialism. In earlier text I supported the 
thesis that the socialist economy goes through two stages (Kornai 1992) – the stage of “forced 
growth” and the stage of decelerated development (stagnation or “zastoi”) [Tchalakov 2002]. 
Taking in mind the contribution of TEN approach to the Schumpeterian model of socialist 
economic development, it is possible to distinguish also an initial stage of creating the necessary 
infrastructure (educational, scientific, technological) prior to the of “forced growth”. This is the stage 
of Bulgaria’s integration into to the industrial states and it can be describe also as a ‘stage of 
technological optimism’. Back then, the 1947 Law on nationalization abolished private ownership 
and the autonomous economic agents and the first two-year economic plan became operational. 
Followed almost two decades until the second half of the 1960s, when the first vertically integrated 
“socialist corporations” were established (IZOT, Metalhim, Balkancar and others) with their proper 
industrial research facilities, and the modern institutes of fundamental and applied research at 
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences were opened. It was not until this first stage of “technological 
optimism” that Bulgaria could start capitalizing the innovations introduced in the developed 
Western economies and receive as a dividend the codified knowledge circulating in various 
techno-economic networks as “information”. At this point, the socialist states that had drawn level 
with the advanced countries and had become comparable with them seemed ready to enter upon 
the next stage of development when they were going to rely on their own original projects and 
innovations.  
Such seems to be the story of socialist industrialisation when the TEN-approach and 
Schumpeter model were applied simultaneously, together with more subtle understanding of 
nomenclature, provided by historical sociology of socialism.  
During these glorious first stages of industrialisation the real entrepreneurial strata in 
socialist society was not just ‘nomenclature’ or ‘apparatus’, but rather the socialism economic 
nomenclature. And just like the entrepreneurs in the capitalist economy, it faced too limitations of 
its activity, imposed by the ‘party’ (political) nomenclature. The functions of the latter in a grotesque 
way resembled those of capitalist bankers. On the one hand, they were controlling the economic 
nomenclature against personal self-enrichment and misappropriation of resources. On the other 
hand, when failing to introduce innovations undertake, the economic nomenclature was under 
thread of being accused for “vreditelstvo” and sabotage. Such blames could be applied also 
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against successful industrial managers provided their power, prestige and popularly threaten the 
power of party nomenclature. In my interviews I have registered numerous such cases of 
threatening and elimination, where number of talented industrial managers were put in prison.  
As we pointed above, during the initial period of building industrial infrastructure and during 
the phase of ‘accelerated growth’ all profited by political nomenclature’s domination. By the end of 
period of ‘accelerated growth’, however, and during the third phase of decelerated development 
the situation changed – the administrative system, based on Plan, on Communist consciousness, 
on open or hidden Terror begun to slip and the need of original innovations became indispensable. 
But what does “original innovation” mean? - It means that the future course of industrialization is 
not known in advance! Could someone late in 1950s conclude, “Socialism is Soviet power plus an 
electronics-based economy”? - Certainly, but only some ten years later, because at the end of the 
1950s none in the developed Westerners was certain of that.10 What happened with the 
nomenclature when copying [Western technology] was no longer possible and the communist 
entrepreneurs felt unsteady in the “emergent configurations”?   
Now we are in better position to answer this question having the triple resources of 
Schumpeter’s model, TEN approach and historical sociology of sociology of socialism: at this point 
the seemingly homogeneous nomenclature split and the contradictions between its contingents 
shot up. It appeared that earlier stages of industrialization when the economic apparatus was 
controlled by party nomenclature had negative long-term effect on its motivation for risk-taking. 
In the last two section of the paper we provided a revised ‘neo-Schumpeterian’ theoretical 
framework for understanding economic development of Eastern European socialism as a specific 
entrepreneurial driven process. It integrated some classical ideas of Schumpeter with more recent 
approaches in understanding the innovation process in late capitalist economies (techno-economic 
network approach) and new finds of historical sociology of socialism about it political and economic 
dynamics. In the last section we will apply this framework in and account of the activity of one of 
the greatest economic leaders of communist Bulgaria, which – I believe, exemplify in a nutshell the 
main features of socialist entrepreneurs. 
 
 
 
4. The socialist entrepreneurs as exemplified by Prof. Ivan Popov – the founder of 
Bulgarian electronic industry 
 
4.1. Bulgaria, 1950s - a newly appointed director at work in a nationalized 
electro-technical plant 
 
In 1949 a still young Bulgarian engineer returned back from Hungary, where he had worked 
for more than 10 years at AEG plant in Budapest. Only his closest friends remembered him, but he 
                                                
10 However, the managers of IBM, DEC, and of several other private companies believed in it because they 
detected an opportunity for real profits. Taking the risk, ten years later they made the new knowledge and 
new technology ‘universally valid’. (Kidder 1981) 
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was immediately appointed as executive director of newly nationalized electro-technical plant 
ELPROM:  
“… In plant consisted of twelve small private workshops, that became state owned 
under the Nationalization Law from December 1947. They were spread all over the city, 
the biggest one being former ‘Bergmann’ factory. Every month there were some accidents, 
usually by fire: we used antiquated technology to produce tubes for electrical wires made 
by asphalt. They burned easily, and this was the period of Tchervenkov’s regime11, tough 
times. So like in Budapest during the war, I was always carrying a small suitcase - I was 
afraid to be arrested at any time and blamed in sabotage, because of these constant 
breakdowns in production.  
I have a luck then, but several years later I had the same problem with a newly build 
electro-porcelain plan, part of my combine.  The plant was located in the town of 
Nikolayevo, 250 kilometres east from the capital, and was producing high-voltage 
insulators, made of three components mixed together and baked in a tunnel furnace. From 
the very beginning the quality of insulators was far below the required specifications, 
although we checked everything and even bought expensive testing equipment. At one 
point I even fired the local manager, yet some series continue to defect in spite our efforts. 
Not surprisingly the state security investigated the case and twelve people at different 
management positions starting with myself were about to face the trial for sabotage. 
Finally we had the chance to find out that all defected insulators were from the series, 
produced during the night shifts and identified a young worker at the dosage installation, 
which after serious talk confessed she was working almost asleep and was doing the 
dosage at random, not respecting the prescriptions. Eventually the defective production 
stopped and the prosecutors had to withdraw their charges against us.” (From the 
interview with the author)  
Already as director at ELPROM combine Ivan Popov begun to teach at the new Electro 
technical faculty at State Polytechnics, which at that period rapidly expanded. There was urgent 
need to qualified teachers and many people from the industry have been invited. So in the second 
half of 1950s he left his directorship to became a professor. However, he preserved his 
relationships with the industry as an expert and consultant. At one point he even worked for three 
years in former DDR: after a visit to their new research centre for high-voltage electrical equipment 
near Berlin, German colleagues asked Bulgarian government Ivan Popov to head one of its 
departments. Making rapid carrier in Berlin, in 1961 the DDR Government offered him to be 
appointed as deputy Minister of electro-technical industry. The rumors said that when this came to 
the ears of Bulgarian communist party leader Todor Zhivkov, he immediately called him back, 
saying that ‘we have not so much talented engineers to work for foreign governments’. Returning 
                                                
11 Vulko Tchervenkov rulled Bulgarian communist party between 1949 and 1954, during the last years of 
Stalin. In 1995 he was replaced under Khrushchev pressure by Todor Zhivkov. During the following the 
regime was considerably softened. Zhikov remained in power till the fall of 1989.  
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in Bulgaria in 1962, Ivan Popov was appointed as head of the newly established State Committee 
for Science and Technical Progress, nominally preserving his professorship.  
4.2. The capitalist past of the socialist entrepreneur and its double heritage 
 
However, Ivan Popov experience with industry had much deeper roots. He managed his first 
‘plant” already in 1934 - a small private workshop, he established in Sofia. Five years before that 
event he graduated mathematics at Sofia University and worked for a year as an assistant 
professor at the renown Bulgarian mathematician Prof. Lyubomir Chakalov. Then he left his job 
and went to the Toulouse Polytechnics in France, being  “much more interested in applied 
sciences than in pure mathematics”. He studied ‘electro-metallurgy of non-ferrous metals’ (then a 
‘high-tech’ field) and graduated in 1933 with diploma of excellence. He was awarded to specialize 
for a year at some leading European companies – Oerlikon, Switzerland, in Braunsweig, Germany 
and in a company near Paris, France.  
In 1934 he return to Bulgaria, but did not managed to find suitable job – at that time there 
barely had any local industry in the field, with the exception of a state-owned military plants. But to 
work for the state was impossible because of his past – when in high school, he was arrested in 
1925 and put for two years in jail because of his affiliation to a clandestine Marxist group. During 
the 1930s his brother Emil Popov was also affiliated with communist movement and was executed 
in 1943 as radio operator of the Soviet residency in Bulgaria. So describing this period Ivan Popov 
remembered:  
“… Coming back to Bulgaria I had to start with the things that I have studied in 
France. I needed at least a welding machine, which was rather expensive at the time, so I 
made it myself, buying the needed special tin from a Swedish firm in Sofia. Then I noticed 
I was not good for welding – my fingers were trembling, if slightly, and I had to change my 
plans. Considering the various possibilities, I decided to start with business that does not 
requires too much equipment, and based on skilled manual work. That is how I created 
this specialized shop –“ELPHA”, which meant ‘Electrical, Laboratory, and PHysical 
Apparatuses’. I have two “hidden” collaborators, assistant professors at the University I 
knew from my previous work. They have been teaching mathematics and physics, but 
both were interested in technology. So I rented two rooms and established the workshop. 
Later a graduate student came to us (in 1960s as University professor she organized the 
production of silicon semiconductors in the country).  
Although we relied on skilled labour, we needed some equipment and I took a loan 
of 20 000 BGL from Popular Bank and bought a drilling machine and small lathe for fine 
items. All the rest we were producing by hand… There were scarcity and hardship in the 
beginning, especially when the terms to pay the loan were approaching. Yet slowly we 
established ourselves in the market and the interest to our services was growing. It was 
the late 1930 years, when the import of electrical and laboratory apparatuses became 
complicated. With the beginning of the war the Bulgarian laboratories had a lot of 
problems to supply the necessary equipment from abroad. So the orders to my firm grew 
 
 
 21 
up. I even managed to stop the import of some apparatuses – I copied some of them, 
others were our own design. For example we produced centrifuges for biological 
experiments, items for physical laboratories, machines for water distillation, high precision 
thermostats, etc. ELPHA became so popular, that we got orders from Rockefeller Institute 
for Contagious Diseases in Sofia, from Bulgarian National Bank, etc. By early 1940s we 
competed already the importers of equipment and often prevailed in the tenders (at one 
point I was even offered money not to participate in the tenders!)   
Seeking to expand my business, I bought a license from Hungary for household 
water electro-heater and launched its production. The heaters were relatively cheap and 
were selling well. But when we redesigned the heater as electric ring, where the 
temperature was higher, we discovered that it became conductive and potentially 
dangerous for the users. So we put a claim to Hungarian firm that the heater does not 
comply with the licence. Meanwhile, I red in a journal about German patent for different 
type of insulator called ‘kohezam’. We experimented with it and found that it is much better 
then the material the Hungarian firm was using. So I wrote the letter to the firm saying that 
now we are able in turn to offer them better solution. Soon the Hungarian firm invited me 
to go to Budapest and to introduce the new insulator in their plant.” (Interview of the 
author)  
So in early 1940 Ivan Popov went to Hungary, leaving ELPHA to his collaborators. Instead 
for few months, he stayed in Budapest for 10 years – first at the partner firm, then as an engineer 
at one of AEG plant in Hungary. Here he found his second wife, a French women living in 
Budapest. So this is where he came from in 1950 to be appointed director of the nationalized 
electrical works in Sofia.  
 
To summarize our story: by early 1960 Ivan Popov was a man with high standing at 
Bulgarian university, industrial and political circles having at the same time more than two decades 
long experience in electrical and mechanical engineering. His experience was accumulated in 
several different countries (France, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany) both in capitalist and 
‘communist’ environment. We are tempted to say that he was ‘right person at the right place’ when 
the new opportunity emerged in the middle of the 1960s.  
 
 
4.3.  The dawn of computer industry in the communist block  
 
What was the industrial situation that emerged in Bulgaria by mid-1960s, after more than two 
decades of socialism? During this initial period the country has already made large-scale 
investment in all three elements of techno-science: 1) trained a large number of specialists, 
competent engineers and researchers; 2) set up laboratories, engineering departments and 
information infrastructure; 3) build its own industrial facilities the light and heavy industry. The 
Central Institute of Scientific and Technical Information began an exchange with kindred 
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establishments in the world. It hosted a “special department” where experts analyzed the reports of 
the spies from the Science and Technology Intelligent Service and submitted them to the industrial 
R&D units. “All of a sudden” the scientific and technical intelligence became important - because 
there already were specialists capable of deciphering the stolen formulas or copied designs and 
relevant industrial facilities established. Here is an interview with a leading industrial scientist in the 
country: 
"... Since the beginning of 1950s Bulgarian entered a period of rapid 
industrialization, but up until mid 1960s it was lagging behind the other CMEA12 countries. 
For example since mid 1950s it developed heavy chemical industry and several big plants 
for fertilizers, potassium soda, etc. were build. But it was the period when the other 
socialist countries were moving to low-volume, high-tech chemical products such as 
pharmaceutical substances and others. Then in late 1950s and early 1960s the machine 
building plants appeared, but the country was completely unknown in this field – so at one 
moment Bulgarian lathes have to be exported under the Czechoslovakian trade marks, no 
one wanted to buy them. The same was in the sector of electrical home appliances – the 
newly build plant were again lagging behind those from other socialist countries – for 
example in late 1950s it started production of radio-receivers on electronic lamps, while 
the analogous Hungarian plant moved to transistors and TV sets. So in all these industrial 
branches our partners from CMEA like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, GDR had an enormous 
head start on us, since these branches had been developing for decades. There was no 
way we could catch up with them.  
Then people started talking about computer technology. At that time one intelligent 
man appeared, Prof. Ivan Popov, who made the estimateion that here all socialist 
countries - not counting the West - were at the same starting line of the race for computer 
technology. He decided to try and see if the country could enter in this new industry and 
could be a match for the others when all started together. He set the task for Bulgaria to 
build the capacity for producing computer technology and implementing it in our 
economy… The main goal of Ivan Popov was to win for Bulgaria one of the strategic 
specializations, which would guarantee high revenues and make it possible to develop a 
wide, complex industrial structure. (From the interview with Prof. Ognyan Tsurnorechki) 
Unlike in other countries, however, there was no relevant industrial experience in Bulgaria in 
producing such devices. How could it win the specialization, especially in competition with other 
countries? At that time there were the CMEA commissions selecting the best prototypes and time 
limits for testing, which were set and approved in Moscow. In each field there had to be at least 
two competing countries. Here the unique industrial experience of Ivan Popov got to work.  
Being already the head of the State Committee for Science and Technical Progress, he 
reported his ideas at one of the meetings at Communist Party Politburo. Most of its members and 
especially the First Secretary Todor Zhivkov were fascinated and typically for totalitarian regime, 
                                                
12 Council of Mutual Economic Assistance between former socialist countries, established in 1954, known 
also as COMECON. 
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Ivan Popov was given significant political power, financial and organizational resources to launch 
his plan. Although his activity was closely monitored, he had enough freedom for decision making. 
His plan had three pillars, where and the technology transfer from the West played crucial role: 
 
1) Establishing close relationships with Western producers of aimed computer devices. 
Reverse engineering these devices; 
2) Building innovative industrial facilities in an unknown scale, and idea which was also 
borrowed from the West; 
3) Providing special protected organizational environment for the development of the new 
industry both a national and international (CMEA) level. In fact Ivan Popov aimed at 
building a ‘socialist cartel’, relatively independent from other heavily bureaucratized CMEA 
structures.  
 
Let us consider these three aspects in reverse order. 
 
1) Creation of Inter-branch Government Commission on Computer Technology (IGCCT) 
In the early 1960s the Warsaw Pact countries started more and more perceptibly to lag 
behind in the field of electronics. The needs of the constantly expanding space program and the 
growing strength of its strategic nuclear forces set high demands on computing technology. 
Intensive work started in the USSR for enhancing production of modern computing technology and 
reaching the quality level of such technology in Western countries. Under these conditions, the 
development of calculating technology was given special attention. The research work done in this 
field in the USSR was enormous, yet insufficient. Hence the potential of other SMEA partners 
became of growing interest for the Soviet Union. Some of the CMEA countries already had 
experience in certain relevant fields: Germany and Czechoslovakia produced precision mechanics, 
optics and microelectronics; Hungary was a respected producer of electrical home appliances. So 
the first ideas about intensifying international co-operation were launched.  
In order to avoid the clumsy procedures for CMEA, at the initiative of Ivan Popov and his 
Soviet counterpart, the Minister of Electronic Industry, a parallel structure was created whose 
priorities were focused entirely on computing technology. In 1969 the USSR, former East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria signed an agreement for the 
creation of IGCCT. In his interview in mid 1990s he describes these events:  
“… At that time we exercised pressure on USSR to create a special commission on 
electronics among socialist countries. We made the proposal together with former soviet 
minister of scientific devices and apparatuses, which had recently became Vice-President 
of GOSPLAN. We decide that we need one commission including representatives of all 
socialist countries, however, it has to outside the structures of CMEA, relatively 
independent of it.  
So we were me and my Soviet colleague who initially designed the IGCCT. And we 
did it this way, because it was already clear enough that CMEA was rather clumsy 
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structure, while computer industry was very dynamic field and we wanted to have close 
control on it. We prepared the entire list of devices we need to produce – the first 
estimates revealed that it were about 105. Then we distributed it among the partner 
countries. We, the Bulgarians, took only three, but among the most important ones – 
memory devices (on magnetic types and magnetic disks), and one of the processors. And 
here we concentrated all our efforts, because these three devices accounted for more than 
40% of the value of a computer center.” (From the interview with Ivan Popov)  
The organisation of this IGCCT was quite different from that of the rigid structures in CMEA. 
For example the decisions were taken not by consensus but by simple majority vote. More 
important, once taken, those decisions became obligatory for all. Two basic lines of development 
were chosen in IGCCT – 1) large computers, at the level of IBM/360 and 2) small computers, at 
the level of the PDP 11 series of DEC. The basic priority was the compatibility between the 
systems, which distinguished them from their Western equivalents. The aim was to achieve a 
complete production cycle and provide peripherals and software.  The IGCCT was headed by the 
Permanent President and the Boards of General Constructors, and has specialised managerial 
structures in different aspects of its activities (Departments of Specialists, DS, and Temporary 
Work Groups, TWG).  
In these management structures each country was represented, both by corresponding 
experts, and by a Chief Constructor. The standards were presented to the Board of 
Standardization in the Permanent Commission on Standardization of CMEA, where they were 
formally ratified. Testing of the products was done by an international commission of the IGCCT. 
When concrete transactions were made, new bi-lateral testing was conducted. Maintaining a 
system of standards and normative documents was one of the most important activities of the 
IGCCT. The strategy was to keep the standards compatible with the current and newly developed 
international standards such as ISO, and those agreed by other (Western) firms. 
 
2) Copying Western technology 
Initially, most CMEA countries were not very active in the IGCCT. Bulgaria was an 
exception. 13 When it came to competitively determining the specialization of the various countries, 
Bulgaria had an advantage and managed to receive specialization in one type of processors and 
two types of memory devices (magnetic disks and tapes).  Prof. Angel Angelov, a close associate 
of Ivan Popov, and Director at that time of the Central Institute of Information Technology, 
describes how it was done:  
                                                
13 It is important that prier to these events Ivan Popov being a head of State Committee for Science and 
Technical Progress has already established good contacts with his Soviet counterparts. For example he used 
the computer ‘Vitosha’ Bulgarian scientists have just created, to popularise country’s potential in field and 
organised its presentation in several exhibitions in Moscow and other countries. See more on this in 
“Bulgarian Historical Report” section at Burton P., and Ivan Tchalakov (eds.) (2001) - Project TACTICS 
(Telematics And Communications Technologies in South East Europe - research report to European 
Commission), Sofia, LIK Publishers 
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“…We had to choose our priorities and propose them in Moscow at the session of 
the Inter-branch Governmental Commission on Computer Technology (IGCCT). Ivan 
Popov organized a kind of brainstorming together with Prof. Borov, Mihail Krimkov, 
Gudelkov, and others. We went down to the first computing centre the country just bought 
from IBM - an enormous hall with over 100 devices. Of all those devices, we chose 4, 
which, in the final account, amounted to more than 50% of the cost of the entire system: 
processors, magnetic tape and disk memory devices, printing devices. When I was leaving 
for Moscow, Ivan Popov said: “If you don’t obtain these specializations for us, don’t bother 
to come back!” (From an interview) Ivan Popov himself remembered: “… initially we took 
only three specializations and put all our efforts on it. We copied them from one Japanese 
and one American firm and put our best specialists to work on it. The selection was in 
Minsk in conditions of severe competition among the socialist countries. The biggest 
competitors were from DDR, but our devices – exact copies of the newest japans models 
won. Which open the road to build all these electronic plants.” (From the interview) 
Ivan Popov’s strategy was to choose the most appropriate Western article (for the magnetic 
tape memory devices the Japanese firm Fujitzu was chosen), buy licences, and through reverse 
engineering, build a production base for those articles. For this purpose all available resources 
were engaged. The basic task was to produce the prototypes. 
While he was negotiating with Fujitzu on their license, he collected the best research teams 
available in the country, which begun reverse engineering on the different parts of the aimed 
devices. One of the members of such a team explained:  
“ Ivan Popov was sending his people to the relevant specialists asking directly how 
much money they want to develop needed element. One day his advisor came to me and 
asked: “How much money you need to design the magnetic tape roller?” I was senior 
researcher and head of the Institute of plastics and rubbers and I had a lot of other 
obligations. So I initially refused his offer. Then he said: “We are not interesting by your 
tasks, Mr. Popov was told you are the person who could do the job and he wants a 
personal contract with you. He is ready to pay all you need.”  
At that times there was a law stipulating that a state employee cannot get additional 
payment bigger than his six monthly salaries. To this added that as director of the institute 
I cannot have a personal contract – it had to pass through the institute, to engage other 
people, etc., which was a long procedure. So we were six people in my team and I 
calculated six-months salaries for all of us thinking he will not accept – 4000 BGL (which 
was about 2500 USD). Then he asked: “How much time you need to fulfil the task?” My 
answer was we would do it for one year. Few days later the advisor came again with 
positive answer. I was still hesitant and said that we made new calculations and realized 
we will need about 6000 BGL. He called Ivan Popov and said: “Mr. Popov want to see you 
personally!”  
When we met each other, Popov said to me: “Here is your offer. So now I am 
signing for 8000 BGL instead of 6000, and you will sign for six months instead of one year. 
 
 
 26 
And being a member of Politburo, I promise you will take personally all the money, you 
could pay no one. ” It was a big temptation and finally I singed out.  
Later I learned he had ordered the same way the electrical step motor, the 
aluminium construction, all mechanical parts. When we, the designers of different parts 
later discussed these events among us, we all agreed – it was enormous amount of work 
and we had underestimated our efforts… But it is how Ivan Popov made us working 12 or 
15 hours a day. So in six months he got the entire prototype of magnetic tape memory 
device. (From an interview with Prof. Ognyan Tsurnorechki) 
While all these stories are running on, the negotiations with Fujitzu continued. By the end of 
the six month period he suddenly proposed instead of a license to sign a long term contract for 
buying determinate number of elements with cannot be produced in Bulgaria. And he asked for 
their permission Bulgaria to produce and sell this device at CMEA market. He argued that 
Japanese company would never receive massive orders from CMEA countries, because these 
were strategic devices and Warsaw pact’s unbreakable condition was at least 95% of the 
equipment in-build in these devices to be produced inside CMEA (hence not to be dependent form 
the West).  
 The president of Fujitzu asked for a month to thing on the offer. During this month a 
Japanese delegation of 30 people visited Bulgaria, which travelled all over the country to look for 
the possible plants where Popov was considering production. They checked everywhere but found 
only I antiquated plant in Sofia producing the outdated Soviet type computers ‘MINSK 10’, one of 
the first computers ever. They did not find even a trace of modern electronics plants. So in the next 
round of negotiations after a month the president of Fujitzu accepted the offer. He though it would 
takes years for Bulgaria to organize the production of these devices. Ivan Popov has already 
prepared the list of components he needed to buy, so he was able to bring them with him on his 
way back to Sofia. And here comes the last element of the Ivan Popov’s strategy. 
 
3) Building innovative industrial facilities in an unknown scale 
Together with reverse engineering and negotiations with Western companies, after careful 
planning (one of the first goal-oriented programs preparing from multidisciplinary team at SCSTP) 
Ivan Popov launched in early 1968 the simultaneous construction of seven plants, which created 
the skeleton of the electronic industry in the country. These plants have been built according to 
then advanced American technology - multifunctional large production halls with electric wires, 
water supply and other communications hidden under the floor. This provided flexibility, so that the 
plants were easily adapted to accommodate changes in production process.  
Interesting enough, even those who designed the building did not know what exactly would 
be produced there. One of his collaborators remembered:  
“...I had the chance to participate in the selection of sites for the new plants and 
when he was giving orders to the industrial architects: “I need a halls 12 meters high with 
all communications underground (electricity, water, etc.). And we need it in six months!” 
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The architects often asked about what he need for these premises, but Ivan Popov joked 
instead –  “I will grow chickens”. (From an interview with one of his collaborators) 
So instead of few years later, Ivan Popov invited Fujitzu’s president just six months after 
they signed the deal to visit the newly build plant near city of Plovdiv where they saw the 
production line with first five memory devices almost completed. The Fujitzu president – former 
colonel form the emperor’s army, was surprised. It appeared that he was also deeply moved and 
said to Ivan Popov: 
 “I have never seen such a miracle. Few months ago my people run all over the 
country and found nothing. For us you were just like empty green meadow. And now you 
are demonstrating five new devices to key up. I promise until I am president our company 
will be behind you. I will send you five of my engineers to train your people on production 
line and we will train at our plants another group of your engineers in "debugging" of the 
devices.” (The words phrased from an interview with Prof. K. Boyanov) 
This collaboration with Fujitzu lasted for more than two decades, while Ivan Popov and 
Fujitzu’s president remained friends for the rest of their life. During those period more than 
hundred Bulgarian electronic engineers spent different periods in time in Japan electronic plants. 
When few months later in autumn of 1968 the meeting of COMECOM committee was held 
and each socialist country presented its prototype, the Bulgarian (Fujitzy) machine showed the 
best characteristics. Ivan Popov got the specialization. During the next two decades the plant in 
Plovdiv had produced series of similar devices, gradually increasing and improving their 
parameters. After this success, he applied the same strategy in developing disk memory devices, 
copying the relevant IBM devices with 7-8 years delay.  
 
 
4.3 A victim of his success – the typical destiny of socialist entrepreneurs 
 
With these successes the popularity of Ivan Popov grew up and soon he became one of the 
most influential men in Bulgarian industry. He was appointed first as head of newly established 
Ministry of electronics, and then he became Vice-Premier Minister. At the same time since the late 
1960s he was member of Communist Party most influential institution – the Politburo. Being 
primarily economic nomenclature and technocrat, however, he had also numerous enemies, 
especially among the orthodox members of communist party top political nomenclature. They 
blamed him for his ‘capitalistic methods’ of management, that he is spending too much money, etc.  
In 1974 during debates in Politburo on the new five years plan, Popov proposed to simulate the 
parameters of the plan in one of the powerful mainframe supercomputers that have been recently 
introduced in USSR and DDR. His proposal faced heater resistance and he was ridiculed for his in 
‘technocratic approach’ and blamed of ignoring the ideological importance in maintaining high 
rates of growth. 
After the meeting the First Secretary Todor Zhivkov invited him in a friendly talk: 
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 “-Do not pay attention to other comrades, just do you job”, Zhivkov said. Ivan Popov 
replied: 
  - Whatever I do it is for my country, not for myself. But I am not able to cite you 
name all the time during the debates. 
I noticed how Zhivkov’s eyes slowly moved up above my head. I immediately 
realized what is going to happen, because I have seen this look already… Few months 
later I was dismissed from Politburo and from the Government and I was sent ambassador 
in Switzerland.” (From an interview with Ivan Popov) 
 
This typical for Zhivkov’s style of ruling, just to isolate the most successful socialist 
entrepreneurs, that threatened his power. Then years later he did the same with the Ognyan 
Doinov, another talented Bulgarian economic leader, sending him not in GULAG, but as 
ambassador in Norway. As far as the Bulgarian electronic industry is concerned, it continued to 
develop in the decades that followed, but not the same way. Its managers remained under taught 
control and never managed to emancipate. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We are now in position of outline the main characteristics of the successful socialist 
entrepreneur, illustrated by the case of Prof. Ivan Popov: 
A) Experience, inherited from the former capitalist environment: 
• Trained in technical sciences both locally and in advanced capitalist countries. 
• Possessing leftist ‘credentials’, i.e. some kind of affiliation to communist movement ‘before 
revolution’ that made possible promotion in economic and political hierarchies;  
• Having learned from an individual, grass-route entrepreneurial experience in the local 
capitalist environment prior to the establishment of socialist economy; 
• The local entrepreneurial experience combined both reverse engineering and original (if 
incremental) innovations; 
• Some knowledge and skills in corporate management, preparing him for the management 
of the emerging socialist combines (both during his specialisations after graduating the 
Polytechnics in Toulouse, and during his stay in Hungary) 
B) Experience, acquired during the early socialist period: 
• Learning how to cope with the pitfalls of socialist industrial management (among them the 
constant monitoring of the secrete police as right hand of communist political 
nomenclature, maintaining good contact with representatives of political nomenclature, 
etc.); 
• Profiting from the integration between industrial sectors, research institutes and higher 
education. Double carrier in science and industrial management;  
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• International contacts with his counterparts in other socialist countries (DDR, USSR, 
Hungary), as resource in the ‘competition’ with CMEA partners. 
C) Resources, provided by the administrative economy: 
• The huge resources of the communist party/state, put in his disposal after gaining access 
to the higher level of economic and political hierarchy, that makes possible  
• Launching reverse engineering in the scale of entire industrial branches (including 
establishment of a system of industrial intelligence), together with  
• Planning of both the industrial process in specific branches and related infrastructures 
(building R&D capabilities, training experts, building capabilities in industrial construction, 
etc.) 
 
D) The tragic destiny to be a victim of his own success due to the structural position of socialist 
entrepreneurs in the political and economic system of socialism.  
The insurmountable conflict between  
- Following the ‘logic’ of socialist industrial development, i.e. the transition of 
development based on reverse engineering to development based on original 
innovation, and 
- Following the ‘logic’ of communist political system, which requires submission to 
the power of political nomenclature, responsible for the doctrinal project.  
 
These features outline the portrait of socialist entrepreneur as tragic and short-leaved, yet 
exciting figure of socialist economic development. 
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